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1 Introduction
In Chap. 7 of his “Theory of Value,” Debreu (1959) showed how to extend the general
equilibrium model to the case of trade under uncertainty with public state verification.
All that is needed is to consider a generalized notion of commodity that also includes
in its description the state of nature on which its delivery is contingent (Arrow 1953).
The model becomes equivalent to the model without uncertainty (Arrow and Debreu
1954; McKenzie 1954): prices of the contingent commodities are announced, and
agents choose the consumption plan that they prefer (specifying a consumption bun-
dle for each of the possible states of nature), among those that satisfy their budget
restriction; after trade agreements are made, the state of nature is publicly announced
and agents receive the consumption bundle that corresponds to the announced state.
We are interested in studying the implications of differential information, in the
form of private and incomplete state verification. While keeping the basic structure
of the model, we assume that each agent is only able to verify (in a court of law, for
contracts to be enforced) that the state of nature belongs to a set of his/her information
partition.
The consequence of incomplete verification is that if an agent has bought different
bundles for delivery in two states and is not able to verify whether the true state is one
or the other, then he/she has to accept delivery of any of the two bundles. This is a
natural generalization of the classical model, in which state verification is complete.1
To study this economic setting, we consider that objects of choice are plans of lists
of bundles such that the agents have the right to receive one of the bundles in the
list that corresponds to the state of nature that occurs (they have to accept any of the
alternatives in the list).2 Contracts in which lists are traded are frequent.
A plane ticket gives you the right to travel if the plane is available at the date of
departure, and if the plane is not available, the right to stay in a hotel and travel on
the next plane. But you cannot verify whether the plane is available or not. If, at the
date of traveling, the airline announces that the plane is not available, you may have
no alternative other than to accept staying in a hotel and traveling on the next day.
Some car insurance contracts give you the right to use another car temporarily, in
case of accident or malfunction. But the substitute car is left undefined in the contract.
It is only stipulated that the car should belong to a certain class. It may be red or
yellow, have radio or not, etc.
Suppose that agent i cannot verify whether the state of nature is s or t , but has,
however, bought xsi for delivery in state s and x
t
i for delivery in state t . Then, if state
s occurs, agent i can receive xsi or x
t
i . When receiving x
t
i in state s, the agent cannot
prove in a court of law that the contract has been violated (state t could be the actual
state and xti the contracted delivery). For the same reason, if state t occurs, the possible
1 A closely related line of research, initiated by Radner (1968), is based on the idea that the consequence
of incomplete information is that an agent must consume the same in states of nature that he/she cannot
distinguish.
2 This concept builds on Arrow’s (1953) notion of contingent goods. A contingent bundle is obviously a
contingent list of bundles with a single element.
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deliveries are also xsi or x
t
i . Observe that the set of alternatives that may be delivered,{xsi , xti }, is the same in the set of states that the agent cannot distinguish, {s, t}.
Something that is constant across states of nature that agent i is unable to distin-
guish is said to be “measurable with respect to private information” or Pi -measurable,
where Pi denotes the information partition of agent i . We can restrict our attention to
Pi -measurable plans of lists, because, as exemplified above, any non-measurable
choice can be converted into a measurable one that is equivalent. Buying a non-
measurable consumption plan (xsi for state s and xti for state t), agent i obtains a
Pi -measurable plan of lists (
{
xsi , x
t
i
}
in state s and
{
xsi , x
t
i
}
in state t). It is important
to understand that this Pi -measurability property of lists is not a restriction on trade,
but the consequence of incomplete state verification on the enforceability of trade
agreements.
This paper is a contribution to the theory of general equilibrium with differential
information. We improve on the model of Radner (1968), essentially by consider-
ing that objects of choice are plans of contingent lists instead of plans of contingent
bundles. The seminal work of Radner (1968) has been complemented by many devel-
opments.3 It is an open question whether these can be extended to the model presented
here.
We have introduced this model of general equilibrium with private and incomplete
state verification in two previous papers (Correia-da-Silva and Hervés-Beloso 2008,
2009). All trade is agreed ex ante, that is, before private information is received. Prices
are announced, and agents choose the plan of contingent lists that they prefer, among
those that belong to their budget set. After receiving their private information, agents
are able to verify to which set of their information partition belongs the true state
of nature. Then, each agent receives a bundle that belongs to the contingent list that
corresponds to the actual state of nature, or to a state of nature that belongs to the
same set of his/her information partition (the agent cannot prove that the contract has
been violated). And, of course, the deliveries to all the agents in the economy must
constitute a feasible allocation.
When buying a list, which of the alternatives should an agent expect to receive? In
our preliminary explorations of this framework, we have studied the case of extreme
pessimism and the case of continuous expectations. If agents expect to receive the
worst possible bundle in a list, there exists an equilibrium in which these expectations
are fulfilled. This is a prudent expectations equilibrium (Correia-da-Silva and Hervés-
Beloso 2009). Agents act very defensively, selecting alternatives with the same utility
for delivery in states that they cannot distinguish. They insure themselves completely
against being deceived. Even if they are deceived, it implies no utility loss. A more
general notion is that of a subjective expectations equilibrium (Correia-da-Silva and
Hervés-Beloso 2008), where the agent’s beliefs about the probabilities of delivery
of the different alternatives in a list are a continuous function of the prices that they
observe (perfectly or imperfectly) and of the alternatives specified in the list.
3 Such as the private core notion (Yannelis 1991), core-convergence results (Einy et al. 2001; Angeloni
and Martins-da-Rocha 2009), study of incentive compatibility (Koutsougeras and Yannelis 1993; Krasa and
Yannelis 1994; Glycopantis et al. 2003), extension to infinite commodity spaces (Hervés-Beloso et al. 2005;
Podczeck and Yannelis 2008) and infinite state spaces (Hervés-Beloso et al. 2009). For a comprehensive
view, see the volume edited by Glycopantis and Yannelis (2005).
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In this paper, we study the case of rational behavior: agents know the model of
the economy, and form their expectations accordingly (Muth 1961).4 This solution
concept is not only more consistent but also more challenging to investigate. In the
case of prudent or subjective expectations, equilibrium could be established by more
or less direct application of Berge’s maximum theorem and Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem. Now, with agents having rational expectations, to establish existence of an
equilibrium, we construct a sequence of Arrow–Debreu economies and show that the
limit of the sequence equilibria is an equilibrium of our economy.
In our model: (1) the price of a plan of contingent lists (specifying a list of possible
bundles for delivery in each state of nature) is equal to the price of the cheapest con-
sumption plan (specifying a bundle for delivery in each state of nature) that satisfies
the requirements of the plan of contingent lists; and (2) this cheapest consumption plan
is actually the alternative that is selected for delivery (in each state, the bundle that is
selected for delivery is the cheapest according to prices for delivery in this state).
Rational agents expect, then, to receive the cheapest possible alternative in each
state of nature.5 Observing the prices of all the contingent commodities and of all
the lists, they can predict which bundle is going to be selected for delivery in each
state of nature. In case of a tie, agents expect to receive the alternative that they prefer
(a similar assumption is made in the mechanism design literature: in case of indiffer-
ence, agents are truthful).
Being able to anticipate the consumption plan that results from buying each plan
of contingent lists, agents can, instead of choosing a plan of lists, choose the resulting
consumption plan. Deliverable consumption plans are those that satisfy a system of
linear inequalities. Consider an agent who does not distinguish between states s and t .
For a consumption plan, (xsi , x
t
i ), to be deliverable, it must be such that ps ·xsi ≤ ps ·xti
and pt · xti ≤ pt · xsi . If these deliverability conditions are not satisfied, then the agent
will not receive xsi in state s and x
t
i in state t (because these would not be the cheapest
alternatives in the corresponding states). An agent with rational expectations chooses
among plans that are deliverable in this sense (denoted xi ∈ Ci (p)).
This deliverable choice set depends, therefore, on prices and on each agent’s private
information. The choice set of each agent is the intersection of the budget set and the
deliverable set, Bi (p) ∩ Ci (p). If the correspondence from prices to the choice set
was continuous, equilibrium existence would be guaranteed. In a bounded economy,
Bi (p) ∩ Ci (p) is upper hemicontinuous. But Ci (p) is not lower hemicontinuous.6
4 A different line of research, associated with the notion of rational expectations, focuses on the revelation
of information by prices (Radner 1979; Allen 1981). But with trade taking place ex ante, an agent cannot
infer the information of the other agents because, at the moment of trade, the other agents still have not
received their information. From the deliveries made at date 1, agents could be able to infer the true state
of nature. But we assume that the information obtained through these inferences cannot be used (in a court
of law, for example) to enforce contracts.
5 Prices differ across states; thus, the cheapest bundle may also differ (which implies that the consumption
plan may not be Pi -measurable).
6 The intersection of continuous correspondences may not be continuous, anyway (Aliprantis and Border
2007).
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This property fails when prices in some state are null or when prices in states s and t ,
with t ∈ Pi (s), are collinear.7
We give an example of non-existence of equilibrium caused by null prices. In the
presence of differential information, prices for delivery (of any commodity) in some
state may be null, even if state-contingent preferences are strictly monotonic. In such
a state, resources are abundant, but no agent can verify that this state has occurred.
As a result, no agent is willing to pay a positive price for delivery contingent on the
occurrence of this state.
To establish existence of equilibrium, we assume that any state of nature can be
verified by at least one agent. The strategy of the proof is to construct a sequence of
Arrow–Debreu economies in which agents that violate the deliverability constraints
suffer a utility penalty, which is increasingly severe along the sequence. This sequence
of economies has a sequence of equilibria, whose limit is an equilibrium of our dif-
ferential information economy.8
Under the same assumption, we show that the equilibrium allocation satisfies weak
coalitional incentive compatibility in the sense of Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993).
After the contracting stage, if state s occurs, a coalition of agents could be interested
in misrepresenting its information, so that the net trades that were agreed for state t
would be carried out instead of those that were agreed for state s. We show that no
coalition of agents who are able to verify that s is the true state of nature is interested
in sending false reports that do not contradict the supposedly truthful reports of the
other agents.
The paper is organized as follows: in Sect. 2, we present the basic setup, explain the
consequences of incomplete information and describe prices and preferences over lists;
in Sect. 3, we define and characterize equilibrium; in Sect. 4, we establish existence and
coalitional incentive compatibility; and, in Sect. 5, we make some concluding remarks.
In appendix, we: (1) collect all the proofs, (2) give an example of non-existence of
equilibrium, and (3) study continuity of the deliverability correspondence.
2 The economy
2.1 Basic setup
The economy extends over two time periods, date 0 and date 1. There is a finite num-
ber of agents, I = {1, . . . , I }, who trade (at date 0) a finite number of commodities,
L = {1, . . . , L}, under uncertainty about which of a finite number of possible states
of nature, S = {1, . . . , S}, will occur (at date 1). The state of nature determines the
endowments and preferences of the agents.
7 With agents having preferences that are Pi -measurable, collinearity does not prevent existence of equi-
librium. In this case, it can be shown that (having convex preferences) agents choose the same bundle for
delivery in both states, implying that the deliverability restrictions are satisfied in equality.
8 The assumption that any state of nature can be verified by at least one agent implies that the prices in
the limit are strictly positive, and this allows us to show that they are actually the equilibrium prices. In the
model of Radner (1968), if free disposal is not allowed, the same assumption is necessary to guarantee the
existence of equilibrium with non-negative prices.
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At date 0, agents know the probabilities of occurrence of each state, μ =
(μ1, . . . , μS) ∈ S . At date 1, if state s occurs, each agent is only able to verify
(and prove in a court of law, for contracts to be enforced) that the state of nature
belongs to the corresponding set of his/her information partition, Pi (s).
Knowing their Pi -measurable vector of strictly positive state-dependent endow-
ments, ei ∈ RSL++ ∩ Pi , agents make (at date 0) contingent trade agreements with the
objective of obtaining a consumption plan, xi ∈ RSL+ , that maximizes their expected
utility, Ui (xi ) = ∑s∈S μsusi (xsi ), where uti = usi ,∀t ∈ Pi (s). Afterward (at date
1), agents receive their endowments and their private information about the state of
nature, and trade agreements are carried out.
In the case of public state verification (Debreu 1959), agents trade contin-
gent commodities. At date 0, taking as given the price system, p ∈ SL ={
p ∈ RSL+ :
∑
s∈S
∑
l∈L psl = 1
}
, agents select the consumption plan that maxi-
mizes their expected utility, among those that belong to their budget set, Bi (p) ={
xi ∈ RSL+ :
∑
s∈S ps · xsi ≤
∑
s∈S ps · esi
}
. At date 1, the state of nature is pub-
licly announced, and the corresponding trade agreements take place (if state s occurs,
each agent i delivers his/her endowment, esi , and receives the consumption bundle that
he/she is entitled to, xsi ).
What happens if agents receive different information? What happens if, instead
of being publicly verifiable, the state of nature is only privately and incompletely
verifiable by each of the agents?
To answer this question, we consider the model of an economy with uncertain
delivery, in which agents select plans of lists instead of consumption plans. At date 0,
taking as given the prices of plans of lists, p˜, each agent i chooses the plan of lists that
he/she prefers, x˜i , among those that belong to his/her budget set. The plan of lists spec-
ifies a set of possible consumption bundles, x˜ si , for delivery in each state of nature, s.
At date 1, if state s occurs, agent i delivers his/her endowment, esi , and receives one
of the alternatives in the list x˜ si (truthful delivery) or an alternative in another list, x˜ ti ,
contracted for delivery in an undistinguishable state of nature, t ∈ Pi (s) (concealed
violation).
2.2 The solution of Radner
In a seminal contribution, Radner (1968) postulated that in states of nature that an
agent does not distinguish, s and t such that t ∈ Pi (s), the same bundle would be
consumed. By simply restricting the consumption set to RSL+ ∩ Pi (meaning that if
t ∈ Pi (s), then xti = xsi ), the classical model could be reinterpreted to cover the case
of private information.
Before presenting a critique of this solution, and an alternative concept, we stress
that, in our economy: having made a contract for the contingent delivery of com-
modities, an agent needs to prove that an event has occurred to enforce delivery. The
meaning of the information partition, Pi , is that, if state s occurs, agent i can prove
that the state of nature belongs to Pi (s) and can use this and only this information to
enforce delivery.
The main objection to the model of Radner (1968) is that agents should not be
restricted to consume the same bundle in states of nature that they do not distinguish
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(even if contracts are only contingent upon events that they can observe). The example
that follows shows that such restriction is too strong.
Consider an economy with two agents. Agent A is endowed with two units of
“sugar,” in all states of nature, S = {s1, s2}, while agent B has uncertain endow-
ments: two units of “tea” in state s1 and two units of “coffee” in state s2:
e
s1
A = es2A = (2, 0, 0), es1B = (0, 2, 0) and es2B = (0, 0, 2).
The preferences of the agents are the same and do not depend on the state of nature.
The goods “tea” and “coffee” are perfect substitutes that agents like to drink with
“sugar”:
u
s1
A = us2A = us1B = us2B =
√
(xtea + xcof )xsug.
Agent A cannot distinguish the two states, which are equiprobable:
PA = {s1, s2} and PB = {{s1}, {s2}}.
With the restriction of consuming the same in indistinguished states of nature, there is
no trade. To see this, observe that agent A would like to consume some “tea” in state s1.
But this would imply equal consumption in state s2, and there is no “tea” in state s2
(only “coffee”).
In a real-life situation, the two agents could make the following agreement (valid
for both states of nature): agent A would deliver one unit of “sugar” in exchange for
one unit of “tea” or one unit of “coffee.” Agent A would get the right to receive “tea or
coffee,” or, to put it another way, would get the right to consume (1, 1, 0) or (1, 0, 1).
Both agents would end up consuming (1, 1, 0) in state s1 and (1, 0, 1) in state s2. This
contract for uncertain delivery allows the agents to attain an optimal outcome.9
Agent A is buying what we call a list of bundles: a derivative good that gives him/her
the right to receive one of the bundles in the list. This suggests that, to improve upon
the solution of Radner (1968), we should allow agents to trade lists of bundles. Then,
some questions arise:
(1) What are the consequences of private state verification?
(2) What is the price of a list of bundles?
(3) What is the utility of a list of bundles?
2.3 The consequences of private state verification
We do not restrict each agent i to select Pi -measurable consumption plans. Agents
are allowed to buy different rights for delivery in states that they do not distinguish.
But, if an agent buys different rights for delivery in two states and is not able to verify
whether the true state is one or the other, then the agent will have to accept delivery
of any of the two.
9 For other examples and a more detailed explanation, see our previous work (2008, 2009).
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As an example, consider an agent i who has bought the bundle xsi for delivery in
state s and the bundle xti for delivery in state t . However, the agent cannot prove in
a court of law whether the true state of nature is s or t . Therefore, when receiving
the bundle xti in state s (or the bundle xsi in state t), the agent cannot prove that the
contract is being violated. This means that if state s occurs, the agent can receive xsi or
xti ; and if state t occurs, the agent can also receive either x
s
i or x
t
i . Observe that the set
of alternatives that may be delivered, {xsi , xti }, is constant across states that the agent
cannot distinguish, {s, t}.
The same reasoning applies to lists. Suppose that agent i has bought the right to
receive a bundle in the list x˜ si if state s occurs and a bundle in the list x˜
t
i if state t
occurs. In state s, agent i may receive xsi /∈ x˜ si (the bundle that is delivered in state
s, xsi , may not belong to the list that was contracted for delivery in state s, x˜
s
i ). The
delivered bundle may belong to a list contracted for delivery in a state t ∈ Pi (s) (this
would be a concealed violation of the contract). All that the agent can guarantee is
that the bundle delivered in state s belongs to
⋃
t∈Pi (s) x˜
t
i .
Notice that if agent i buys the same lists for delivery in the states that he cannot dis-
tinguish, then
⋃
t∈Pi (s) x˜
t
i = x˜ si , and therefore the agent will receive what she bought:
a bundle xsi ∈ x˜ si (in state s).
Formally, for each agent i ∈ I:
(i) A contingent list for delivery in state s is a finite and non-empty subset of RL+,
denoted x˜ si ∈ F(RL+);10
(ii) A plan of lists is a vector of contingent lists, x˜i ∈ (F(RL+))S , specifying a list
for delivery in each of the possible states of nature;
(iii) a Pi -measurable plan of lists is a vector of contingent lists such that t ∈ Pi (s) ⇒
x˜ ti = x˜ si , denoted x˜i ∈ (F(RL+))S ∩ Pi .
To each plan of lists corresponds a list of consumption plans, (x˜i ) ∈ F(RSL+ ), defined
as the collection of all the consumption plans, xi ∈ RSL+ , that can be formed by select-
ing, for each state of nature, a bundle of the corresponding contingent list, xsi ∈ x˜ si . It
is defined, thus, as the cartesian product of the contingent lists: (x˜i ) = s∈S x˜ si .
We define a transformation, Mi , to describe the consequences of incomplete infor-
mation. If agent i buys a plan of lists x˜i , the set of consumption bundles that he/she
may receive in state s is Msi (x˜i ), defined as:
Msi : (F(RL+))S −→ F(RL+);
Msi (x˜i ) =
⋃
t∈Pi (s)
x˜ ti .
Therefore, for agent i , buying x˜i is equivalent, from the point of view of deliveries,
to buying the Pi -measurable (by construction) plan of lists Mi (x˜i ) =
(
Msi (x˜i )
)
s∈S .
The resulting list of possible consumption plans is 
[
Mi (x˜i )
]
. If xi ∈ 
[
Mi (x˜i )
]
,
we either have a truthful delivery or a concealed violation of the contract.
10 Here and everywhere below, F(·) denotes the set of finite and non-empty subsets.
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In the model of Radner (1968), the consequence of incomplete information is a
restriction of the choice set to Pi -measurable plans of consumption bundles. Here,
the consequences are less stringent. An agent can enforce delivery of Pi -measurable
plans of lists (which include all Pi -measurable consumption plans), but this does not
imply Pi -measurability of the resulting consumption plan.
2.4 Prices of lists
The prices of contingent goods are normalized to belong to the simplex:
p ∈ SL =
{
p ∈ RSL+ :
∑
s∈S
∑
l∈L
psl = 1
}
.
In economies with uncertain delivery, we must extend prices to the space of plans
of lists:
p˜ : (F(RL+))S −→ R+.
We do this by restricting equilibrium prices to satisfy a “fundamental value” assump-
tion: the price of a plan of contingent lists must be equal to the price of the cheapest
plan of consumption bundles that satisfies the requirements of the plan of lists. To
present this assumption, it is convenient to define p˜s as the price of a list for delivery
in state s.
Assumption 1 Let the prices of contingent goods be p ∈ SL . The price of a plan of
contingent lists, x˜i , is:
p˜ (x˜i ) =
∑
s∈S
p˜s
(
x˜ si
) =
∑
s∈S
min
xsi ∈x˜ si
{
ps · xsi
}
.
Under this assumption, the budget restriction can be written as:
B˜i (p) =
{
x˜i ∈ (F(RL+))S :
∑
s∈S
min
xsi ∈x˜ si
{ps · xsi } ≤ p · ei
}
.
2.5 Deliveries and preferences
When buying a plan of lists, agents form expectations about the resulting deliveries.
These expectations, together with preferences over consumption plans, induce pref-
erences over plans of lists. We start by making standard assumptions on preferences
over consumption plans. Once we know the relationship between lists and deliveries,
it will become clear how to obtain preferences over plans of lists from preferences
over consumption plans.
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Assumption 2 Preferences over consumption plans are represented by an expected
utility function, Ui (xi ) = ∑s∈S μsusi (xsi ), where each state-dependent utility func-
tion, usi : RL+ → R, is continuous, concave and strictly increasing.11
We impose a precise relationship between the plans of lists that are chosen by the
agents and the actual deliveries. We assume that the consumption plan that is delivered
is one of the cheapest among those that the agent must accept. In case of a tie, agents
receive the consumption plan with the highest utility among the cheapest. This is in
the spirit of the mechanism design literature, where incentive compatibility conditions
only need to be satisfied in equality (in case of indifference, the agent is assumed to
select the action that is preferred by the principal).
The set of the cheapest consumption plans, at prices p, among those in 
[
Mi (x˜i )
]
,
is denoted by Y˜i (x˜i , p):
Y˜i : (F(RL+))S × SL −→ F(RSL+ );
Y˜i (x˜i , p) =
{
xi ∈ RSL+ : xi ∈ argmin
zi ∈[Mi (x˜i )]
{p · zi }
}
.
Assumption 3 For given prices of contingent goods, p ∈ SL , if agent i chooses the
plan of lists x˜i , the consumption plan that will be delivered is:
xi ∈ argmax
zi ∈Y˜i (x˜i ,p)
Ui (zi ).
Knowing this relationship, rational agents are able attribute to each plan of lists the
utility of the consumption plan that will actually be delivered.
For agent i , the expected utility of a plan of lists, x˜i , at prices p, is defined as:
Vi : (F(RL+))S × SL −→ R;
Vi (x˜i , p) = max
xi ∈Y˜i (x˜i ,p)
Ui (xi ).
The problem of agent i can, therefore, be written as:
max
x˜i ∈B˜i (p)
Vi (x˜i , p).
Observe that adding to a list an alternative that is more expensive than those that
are already in the list does not affect the price nor the utility of the list. Therefore,
there are many plans of lists that solve that problem of the agent.
Suppose that agent i chooses a plan of lists, x˜i , with an anticipated delivery of xi
(composed of the cheapest bundles in each state of nature). The agent would not mind
changing his/her choice to Mi (xi ) because the utility is the same as that of x˜i and the
11 By strictly increasing, we mean that xs ≥ ys and xs 	= ys implies that usi (xs ) > usi (ys ).
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price is not higher.12 This change consists in removing the irrelevant alternatives in
the lists (those that are never delivered, and, therefore, do not affect the price of the
list).
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Concept
Recall that we are considering an economy with a finite number of agents, I =
{1, . . . , I }, who trade (at date 0) a finite number of commodities, L = {1, . . . , L},
under uncertainty about which of a finite number of possible states of nature, S =
{1, . . . , S}, will occur (at date 1).
At date 0, taking as given the prices of plans of lists, p˜, agent i trades his/her
contingent endowments, ei ∈ RSL++ ∩ Pi , for a plan of contingent lists, x˜i =
(x˜1i , x˜
2
i , . . . , x˜
s
i ) ∈ (F(RL+))S , that specifies the bundles that may be delivered
in each state of nature. At date 1, if state s occurs, agent i receives a bundle
xsi ∈ Msi (x˜i ) =
⋃
t∈Pi (s) x˜
t
i .
When buying a plan of lists, x˜i , agent i expects to receive the cheapest consumption
plan in 
[
Mi (x˜i )
]
. Therefore, the expected utility of the plan of lists is the expected
utility of this cheapest consumption plan, Vi (x˜i , p).
In equilibrium, given prices p˜∗, each agent i chooses an individually optimal plan
of lists, x˜∗i , and receives a consumption plan, x∗i ∈ 
[
Mi (x˜∗i )
]
that has the anticipated
utility, Vi (x˜∗i , p∗), with the allocation, {x∗i }i∈I , being feasible.
Definition 1 An equilibrium of an economy with uncertain delivery, (x˜∗, x∗, p˜∗), is
composed of plans of lists, x˜∗ = (x˜∗1 , . . . , x˜∗I ); an allocation, x∗ = (x∗1 , . . . , x∗I ); and
a price system, p˜∗, whose restriction to consumption plans is p∗ ∈ SL . These are
such that:
(1) The price of a plan of lists, z˜i ∈ (F(RL+))S , is equal to the price of
the cheapest consumption plan that satisfies the requirements of the plan of lists,
p˜∗ (z˜i ) = ∑s∈S minzsi ∈z˜si
{
ps∗ · zsi
}
;
(2) In each state of nature, s ∈ S, the bundle that is delivered to each agent
i ∈ I is one of the cheapest that the agent has to accept, more precisely,
x∗i ∈ argmaxzi ∈Y˜i (x˜∗i ,p∗) Ui (zi );
(3) For each agent i ∈ I, the chosen plan of lists, x˜∗i ∈ (F(RL+))S , max-
imizes expected utility, Vi (x˜∗i , p∗), in the agent’s budget set, B˜i (p∗) ={
z˜i ∈ (F(RL+))S : p˜∗ (z˜i ) ≤ p∗ · ei
}
;
(4) The allocation, x∗ ∈ (RSL+ )I , is feasible,
∑
i∈I x∗i ≤
∑
i∈I ei .
Observe that the informational constraints are present: in condition (2), which estab-
lishes the (price-dependent) relationship between plans of lists that are bought and
consumption plans that are delivered; and in condition (3), according to which each
12 Recall that Mi (xi ) =
(
Msi (xi )
)
s∈S , with M
s
i (xi ) =
⋃
t∈Pi (s) x
t
i .
123
740 J. Correia-da-Silva, C. Hervés-Beloso
agent chooses a plan of lists by comparing the utility of the consumption plans that
will be delivered.13
Notice also that condition (1) is simply a restatement of Assumption 1.
In the next section, we reformulate the problem of the agent from a choice over
plans of lists to a choice over the consumption plans that result from the plans of lists
that are chosen. This allows us to arrive at a formulation of the equilibrium concept
that only refers to consumption plans (and not plans of lists) and that, for this reason,
is more tractable.
3.2 Deliverable consumption plans
Suppose that agent i buys a plan of singleton lists for delivery in two possible states of
nature, x˜i = (xsi , xti ). If the agent can distinguish states s and t , then Mi (x˜i ) = (xsi , xti ),
and thus delivery of xsi in state s and x
t
i in state t is guaranteed. But if the agent cannot
distinguish the two states, then we have Mi (x˜i ) =
({
xsi , x
t
i
}
,
{
xsi , x
t
i
})
. As a result,
the agent receives, in state s, the cheapest of the two alternatives according to ps ; and
in state t , the cheapest according to pt .
The bundle that is delivered in state s cannot be more expensive (according to prices
for delivery in state s) than any of the bundles promised for delivery in states t ∈ Pi (s):
∀t ∈ Pi (s), ps · xsi ≤ ps · xti .
The set of deliverable consumption plans depends on prices. This dependence is
described by the deliverability correspondence, defined below.
Definition 2
Ci : SL  RSL+ ;
Ci (p) =
{
xi ∈ RSL+ : ∀s ∈ S, ps · xsi = mint∈Pi (s){p
s · xti }
}
.
A consumption plan is deliverable, xi ∈ Ci (p), if and only if there exists a Pi -measur-
able plan of lists of which xi is the cheapest alternative. It is enough to check whether
or not xi is the cheapest alternative in the list Mi (xi ).
We can formulate the problem of the agent, equivalently, as a choice over
lists in B˜i (p) or as a choice over consumption plans in Bi (p) ∩ Ci (p), with
Bi (p) =
{
xi ∈ RSL+ : p · xi ≤ p · ei
}
. The following results make this precise.
Claim 1 Let p˜ be a price system that satisfies Assumption 1. Then,
x˜i ∈ argmax
z˜i ∈B˜i ( p˜)
Vi (z˜i , p) ⇒ ∃xi ∈ 
[
Mi (x˜i )
]
13 More formally, the information structure Pi enters the definition of equilibrium in the following way.
Recall that Vi (x˜i , p∗) = maxxi ∈Y˜i (x˜i ,p∗) Ui (xi ), where Y˜i (x˜i , p
∗) = argminzi ∈[Mi (x˜i )]
{
p∗ · zi
}
. In
turn, 
[
Mi (x˜i )
] = s∈S Msi (x˜i ), where Msi (x˜i ) = ∪t∈Pi (s) x˜ ti .
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s.t. Ui (xi ) = Vi (x˜i , p) ∧ xi ∈ argmax
xi∈Bi (p)∩Ci (p)
Ui (xi ).
Claim 2 Let p˜ be a price system that satisfies Assumption 1. Then,
xi ∈ argmax
xi ∈Bi (p)∩Ci (p)
Ui (xi ) ⇒ Mi (xi ) ∈ argmax
x˜i∈B˜i ( p˜)
Vi (x˜i , p).
This equivalence allows us to reformulate the notion of equilibrium.
Definition 3 A fundamental equilibrium of an economy with uncertain delivery,
(x∗, p∗), is composed of an allocation, x∗ = (x∗1 , . . . , x∗I ) and a price system,
p∗ ∈ SL , which are such that:
(1) Each agent’s choice is optimal, x∗i ∈ argmaxxi ∈Bi (p∗)∩Ci (p∗) Ui (xi );(2) The allocation, x∗, is feasible. That is, ∑i∈I x∗i ≤
∑
i∈I ei .
In this reformulation, we removed the reference to lists because their prices can be
obtained (by Assumption 1) from the prices of contingent goods and because optimal
plans of lists for the agents to choose are simply given by Mi (x∗i ), ∀i ∈ I.
Claim 3 If (x˜∗, x∗, p∗) is an equilibrium of an economy with uncertain delivery, then
(x∗, p∗) is a fundamental equilibrium.
Claim 4 If (x∗, p∗) is a fundamental equilibrium of an economy with uncertain deliv-
ery, then (M(x∗), x∗, p∗), with M(x∗) = (Mi (x∗i )
)
i∈I , is an equilibrium.
This alternative definition of equilibrium does not use preferences over lists, Vi , nor
prices over lists, p˜. Therefore, we can compare it with the equilibrium with pub-
lic state verification (Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie under uncertainty) and the equilib-
rium with differential information proposed by Radner (1968). Everything boils down
to the choice sets. In Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie: X ADi = RSL+ ; in Radner (1968):
X Ri = RSL+ ∩ Pi ; in an economy with uncertain delivery: Xi (p) = RSL+ ∩ Ci (p). It
should be clear that, for all p ∈ SL , X Ri ⊆ Xi (p) ⊆ X ADi .
4 Existence of equilibrium
If the correspondence from prices to the deliverable budget set, Bi (p) ∩ Ci (p), were
continuous, establishing existence of equilibrium would be straightforward. But, as
we illustrate in Appendix 3, Ci (p) is not lower hemicontinuous (this property fails
when prices in some state are null, or when prices in two undistinguished states are
collinear).
4.1 A sequence of economies
In order to establish existence of equilibrium, we construct a sequence of economies.
In these economies, the choice set is not constrained to satisfy the deliverability condi-
tions. But violating these constraints implies an utility penalty. The penalty is a function
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of the difference between the cheapest consumption plan and the consumption plan
that is delivered.14
In the economy E j , if state s occurs, the utility penalty imposed on agent i is:
Zsji (xi , p) = j maxt∈Pi (s){p
s · xsi − ps · xti }.
Since s ∈ Pi (s), the maximum is at least zero; thus, penalties are never negative.
Penalties are scaled up along the sequence of economies, and this is actually the only
difference among the economies in the sequence.
In the economy E j , the utility functions of the agents are:
U ji (xi , p) = Ui (xi ) − j
∑
s∈S
μs max
t∈Pi (s)
{ps · xsi − ps · xti }.
For any j ∈ N, the utility functions are continuous in consumption plans and prices,
(xi , p) ∈ RSL+ × SL . The maximum of linear functions is a convex function, and
multiplying a convex function by a negative constant, − j , yields a concave function.
Hence, the objective function, U ji (xi , p), is concave in the first variable. Observe also
that the utility penalty preserves the property of no satiation. The plan xi +1¯ is always
preferred to xi (the utility penalty is kept constant). The fact that the utility functions
depend (continuously) on prices does not interfere with existence of equilibrium.15
Lemma 1 Let E j be an Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie economy in which each agent i ∈
I:
– has strictly positive initial endowments, ei ∈ RSL++;
– maximizes the utility function U ji (xi , p) = Ui (xi )− j
∑
s∈S μs maxt∈Pi (s){ps · xsi− ps · xti }, with Ui (xi ) continuous, concave, and strictly increasing.
Then, there exists an Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie equilibrium, (x j , p j ).
The sequence of economies, {E j } j∈N, has a sequence of equilibria, {(x j , p j )} j∈N,
that lies in the compact set [0, eT ]I × SL , where eT = ∑i∈I ei . There exists a
subsequence that converges. In order to show that the limit, (x∗, p∗), is a fundamental
equilibrium of the original economy with uncertain delivery, we must prove that the
following conditions are satisfied:
(1) Feasibility: ∑i∈I x∗i ≤
∑
i∈I ei ;
(2) Budget restriction: ∀i ∈ I, p∗ · x∗i ≤ p∗ · ei ;
14 These economies are an artifice to establish existence of equilibrium.
15 With price-dependent preferences, it is known that equilibrium exists (Arrow and Hahn 1971). In the
context of economies with uncertain delivery, see Correia-da-Silva and Hervés-Beloso (2008).
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(3) Deliverability: ∀i ∈ I, x∗i ∈ Ci (p∗);
(4) Individual optimality: ∀i ∈ I, xi ∈ Bi (p∗) ∩ Ci (p∗) ⇒ Ui (x∗i ) ≥ Ui (xi ).
It is easy to show that the first three conditions are satisfied.
Lemma 2 Consider a sequence of economies {E j } j∈N defined as in Lemma 1, and a
corresponding sequence of equilibria, {(x j , p j )} j∈N.
Then, the sequence of equilibria has an accumulation point, (x∗, p∗), that satisfies:
(1) Feasibility: ∑i∈I x∗i ≤
∑
i∈I ei = eT ;
(2) Budget restriction: ∀i ∈ I, p∗ · x∗i ≤ p∗ · ei ;
(3) Deliverability: ∀i ∈ I, x∗i ∈ Ci (p∗).
The difficult part of the proof is to verify condition (4): that the limit, (x∗, p∗), max-
imizes utility in the deliverable budget set, Bi (p∗) ∩ Ci (p∗). The fact that Ci is not
lower hemicontinuous (as shown in Appendix 3) could prevent (x∗, p∗) from being
optimal. There could be a deliverable consumption plan yi ∈ Bi (p∗) ∩ Ci (p∗) that
is not even nearly deliverable in the economies in the sequence. In spite of having a
low utility level for high j (because of the penalty), this plan could be optimal in the
original economy, and, in this case, (x∗, p∗) would not be an equilibrium (an example
of non-existence of equilibrium is given in Appendix 2).
We start by showing that if any state of nature, s ∈ S can be verified by at least one
of the agents, then p∗ is strictly positive.
Lemma 3 Consider a sequence of economies {E j } j∈N defined as in Lemma 1, a corre-
sponding sequence of equilibria, {(x j , p j )} j∈N, and an accumulation point, (x∗, p∗).
Suppose that for every s ∈ S, there exists i ∈ I with Pi (s) = {s}. Then, p∗  0.
4.2 The existence result
If agents have Pi -measurable endowments and preferences, and if any state can be
verified by at least one of the agents, existence of equilibrium is guaranteed.
Theorem 1 Consider an economy with uncertain delivery, E ≡ (ei , ui , μi , Pi )i∈I ,
such that:
– Preferences are represented by an expected utility function, Ui (xi ) =∑
s∈S μsusi (x
s
i ), where each u
s
i : RL+ → R is continuous, concave, and strictly
increasing;
– Contingent preferences are the same in indistinguished states, t ∈ Pi (s) ⇒
uti (·) = usi (·);
– Initial endowments are strictly positive and constant across indistinguished states:
ei ∈ RSL++ ∩ Pi =
{
ei ∈ RSL++ : t ∈ Pi (s) ⇒ eti = esi
}
;
– For each s ∈ S, there exists i ∈ I with Pi (s) = {s}.
Then, there exists an equilibrium of the economy with uncertain delivery.
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The strategy of the proof is to assume (by way of contradiction) that there exists a
x ′i in Bi (p∗) ∩ Ci (p∗) that is preferred to x∗i and then find that there exists a similar
xi which belongs to Bi (p j ) ∩ Ci (p j ), for large j . This contradicts that (x j , p j ) is an
equilibrium of E j , because xi would also be preferred to x ji in the economy E j .
4.3 Incentive compatibility
One may wonder whether agents may have an incentive to misrepresent their informa-
tion. In some state s ∈ S, a coalition of agents G ⊂ I may wish to send false reports
which imply that the net trades that were agreed for state t are carried out instead of
those that were agreed for state s. This will be the case if it all the agents gain with the
deviation, usi (e
s
i + xti −eti ) > usi (xsi ), ∀i ∈ G, if the false reports do not contradict the
supposedly truthful reports of the other agents, t ∈ ∩ j∈I\G Pj (s), and if it is common
knowledge among the members of the coalition that they should send false reports,
Pi (s) = Pj (s),∀(i, j) ∈ G2. If this is never the case, it is said that the allocation
satisfies weak coalitional incentive compatibility (Koutsougeras and Yannelis 1993).
Definition 4 An allocation, x = (x1, . . . , xI ), satisfies weak coalitional incentive
compatibility if and only if it is not true that in some state, s ∈ S, there exists a coalition,
G ⊂ I, whose members agree that they should deviate, Pi (s) = Pj (s), ∀(i, j) ∈ G2,
and an undetectable deviation, t ∈ ∩k∈I\G Pk(s), with which all the members of the
coalition become better off, usi (e
s
i + xti − eti ) > usi (xsi ), ∀i ∈ G.
In the conditions of Theorem 1, we find that an equilibrium allocation always satisfies
weak coalitional incentive compatibility.
Theorem 2 Consider an economy with uncertain delivery, E ≡ (ei , ui , μi , Pi )i∈I ,
that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1.
If x∗ is an equilibrium allocation, then it satisfies weak coalitional incentive com-
patibility.
To understand why weak coalitional incentive compatibility holds,16 suppose that,
in state s, the agents in a coalition send false reports (that do not contradict the truthful
reports of the other agents) which imply that the net trades that are carried out are
those that were agreed for state t . The fact that the agents outside the coalition cannot
distinguish state s from t implies that they must have the same endowments in both
states and must receive a net trade in state t that is at least as expensive (according to
prices ps∗) as the net trade that was contracted for state s (because of the deliverability
constraints). Since the coalition receives an aggregate net trade that is symmetric to the
aggregate net trade of the agents outside the coalition, we conclude that the coalition
ends up receiving a net trade that is not more expensive (again, according to prices
ps∗) than the contracted one. But a cheaper net trade could never yield more utility
to an agent of the coalition, as this would contradict the fact that the initial choice
maximized utility (for all agents in the coalition, utility maximization for state s is not
subject to any deliverability constraint because Pi (s) = {s}).
16 A formal proof is presented in Appendix 1.
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A stronger incentive compatibility property dispenses the requirement that the
agents agree that they should deviate, Pi (s) = Pj (s), ∀(i, j) ∈ G2. It is not guar-
anteed that an equilibrium allocation satisfies this stronger notion, designated as coa-
litional incentive compatibility by Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993).17
5 Concluding remarks
In our model of trade ex ante with differential information, agents make contingent
trade contracts before receiving their private information and then use their private
information to enforce contracts. A contract attributes a list of possible consumption
bundles to each element of the agent’s information partition.
Agents must, then, form expectations about which of the bundles in the list they
will actually consume in each of the states of nature. In previous works (2008, 2009),
we have considered two distinct cases: (i) agents expected to receive the bundle with
the lowest possible utility (prudent expectations) and (ii) agents formed a probability
belief about the delivery that was some continuous function of both the elements of
the list and of prices (subjective expectations).
However, in our model, agents always receive, in each state of nature, the cheapest
consumption bundle among those in a list. Therefore, it is more consistent (and it is
what we do in this paper) to assume that agents expect to receive, in each state of
nature, the cheapest consumption bundle among those in a list (rational expectations).
To study this more interesting case, we showed that our setup in which agents
choose among plans of lists can be translated into the more typical setup in which
agents choose among consumption plans. All that is necessary is to modify the choice
correspondence of the agents, restricting it to what we called the deliverability cor-
respondence. This choice set always includes the set of Pi -measurable consumption
plans.
The fact that the deliverability correspondence is not lower hemicontinuous prevents
us from applying Berge’s maximum theorem to establish existence of equilibrium. In
fact, with agents having rational expectations, existence of equilibrium is no longer
guaranteed. To establish existence of equilibrium, we needed to assume that any state
of nature can be perfectly verified by at least one agent. Most of the technical work
in this paper is devoted to the existence proof, which is based on the construction
of a sequence of Arrow–Debreu economies whose limit is similar to our differential
information economy.
A central issue in most models of trade with differential information is whether
agents have the incentives to reveal their private information in a truthful way. We find
that, given an equilibrium allocation, if agents could misrepresent their information,
the assumption that any state of nature can be perfectly verified by at least one agent
guarantees that no coalition is able to gain by sending false reports.
Our final remarks address two crucial assumptions that are made in this paper. One
is that the information provided by the agents to enforce contracts is not aggregated by
17 Krasa and Yannelis (1994) designate it as weak coalitional incentive compatibility to distinguish it from
a stronger notion in which endowment redistributions among the members of the coalition are permitted.
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any institution. Otherwise, such an institution could announce the true state of nature,
and state verification would become public. Another assumption is that agents cannot
trade after receiving their information. The study of the consequences of removing
this restriction is left for future research.
Appendix 1: The proofs
Proof of Claim 1 Let xi = argmaxzi ∈Y˜i (x˜i ,p) Ui (zi ). Such xi is an element of

[
Mi (x˜i )
]
and is such that Ui (xi ) = Vi (x˜i , p). Suppose that there exists yi ∈
Bi (p) ∩ Ci (p) that is preferred to xi : Ui (yi ) > Ui (xi ).
Since yi ∈ Ci (p): Vi (Mi (yi ), p) ≥ Ui (yi ) > Ui (xi ) = Vi (x˜i , p).
From Assumption 1: p˜(Mi (yi )) ≤ p · yi . Therefore, Mi (yi ) ∈ B˜i ( p˜). Contradic-
tion. unionsq
Proof of Claim 2 We know that Vi (Mi (xi ), p) = Ui (xi ).
Suppose that there exists y˜i ∈ B˜i (p) that is preferred to Mi (xi ): Vi (y˜i , p) >
Vi (Mi (xi ), p).
Let yi = argmaxzi ∈Y˜i (y˜i ,p) Ui (zi ). Then: Ui (yi ) = Vi (y˜i , p) > Vi (Mi (xi ), p) =
Ui (xi ).
From Assumption 1: y˜i ∈ B˜i (p) ⇒ yi ∈ Bi (p). Contradiction. unionsq
Proof of Claim 3 The proof follows directly from Definitions 1 and 3 and from
Claim 1. unionsq
Proof of Claim 4 The proof follows directly from Definitions 1 and 3 and from
Claim 2. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 1 Restrict the choice set to the compact [0, T ], with T = 2 ∑i∈I ei .
Consider correspondences, {ψi }i∈I , which assign to given prices, p, consumption
plans, x ′i , that maximize U
j
i (xi , p) in the restricted budget set, Bi (p) = Bi (p)∩[0, T ]:
ψi : [0, T ]I × SL −→ [0, T ];
x ′i ∈ ψi (x, p) ⇔ x ′i ∈ argmax
xi∈Bi (p)
U ji (xi , p).
Consider also a correspondence, ψp, that assigns to the total demand,
∑
i∈I xi , the
prices, p′, which maximize the value of excess demand:
ψp : [0, T ]I × SL −→ SL ;
p′ ∈ ψp(x, p) ⇔ p′ ∈ argmax
p∈SL
{
p ·
∑
i∈I
(xi − ei )
}
.
The objective functions, {U ji }i∈I and p ·
∑
i∈I(xi − ei ), are continuous, and Bi (p)
is a continuous correspondence. We can, therefore, use Berge’s maximum theorem to
show that each of the correspondences, {ψi }i∈I and ψp, is upper hemicontinuous with
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non-empty and compact values. They also have convex values because the objective
functions are concave. The product correspondence retains these properties and maps
a compact set into itself:
ψ ≡
I∏
i=1
ψi × ψp;
ψ : [0, T ]I × SL −→ [0, T ]I × SL ;
(x ′, p′) ∈ ψ(x, p) ⇔ x ′i ∈ ψi (x, p), ∀i ∈ I and p′ ∈ ψp(x, p).
Existence of a fixed point, (x∗, p∗), follows from Kakutani’s theorem.
It is clear that x∗i solves the problem of agent i .
The fact that p∗ maximizes the value of excess demand implies that:
p′ ·
∑
i∈I
(x∗i − ei ) ≤ p∗ ·
∑
i
(x∗i − ei ) ≤ 0, for all p′ ∈ SL .
Making p′ = esl = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0), for each (s, l) ∈ S × L, shows that x∗ is
feasible:
∑
i∈I(x∗i − ei ) ≤ 0.
The usual extension from [0, T ]I to (RSL+ )I applies. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 2 Consider only the subsequence that converges to (x∗, p∗). Ignore
the remaining terms of the sequence.
(1) The set of feasible allocations is closed, and the limit allocation, {x∗i }i∈I , is the
limit of a sequence of feasible allocations; therefore, it is feasible (∑i∈I x∗i ≤∑
i∈I ei ).
(2) The limit allocation is the limit of a sequence of allocations in the sequence of
budget sets (x ji ∈ Bi (p j ),∀i ∈ I); therefore, it also belongs to the limit budget
set (x∗i ∈ Bi (p∗),∀i ∈ I).
Suppose that x∗i does not satisfy the budget restriction of agent i . Let α =
2‖eT ‖ + 1, and select  >0 such that p∗ · x∗i − p∗ · ei = α. Choosing a suffi-
ciently high j , we can guarantee that ‖x∗ − x j‖ <  and ‖p∗ − p j‖ < . With
p j = p∗ + dp, x j = x∗i + dxi , and manipulating:
(p∗ + dp) · (x∗i + dxi ) − (p∗ + dp) · ei = p∗ · x∗i − p∗ · ei
+p∗ · dxi + dp · x∗i + dp · dxi − dp · ei
= α + (p∗ + dp) · dxi + dp · (x∗i − ei )
> α −  −  · 2‖eT ‖ = 0.
This means that x ji /∈ Bi (p j ). Contradiction.
(3) To verify that the limit allocation, x∗, satisfies the deliverability restrictions in
the limit economy, suppose that x∗i violated one of the restrictions by more than
δ > 0. then, for sufficiently high j , x ji would also violate the same restriction by
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more than δ. For t ∈ Pi (s), ∃ j0 ∈ N:
ps∗ · xs∗i > ps∗ · xt∗i + δ ⇒ ps j · xs ji > ps j · xt ji + δ, for all j > j0.
Utility among feasible allocations is bounded by Ui (eT ), so we can consider a j
that is sufficiently high for jδ > Ui (eT ) − Ui (ei ). It would follow that U ji (x ji ) <
Ui (x
j
i ) − jδ < Ui (x ji ) − Ui (eT ) + Ui (ei ) < Ui (ei ) = U ji (ei ). Contradiction. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 3 Consider a subsequence of equilibria, {(xn, pn)}n∈N, that con-
verges to (x∗, p∗) and assume (by way of contradiction) that ∃(s, l)∈S × L : psl∗=0.
Consider agent i with Pi (s) = {s} and his/her optimal choices, xni ∈ argmaxz∈Bi (pn)
U ni (z).
We know that xni ≤ eT ,∀n ∈ N. Then, x∗i ≤ eT .
Observe that usi (zs) > u
s
i (x
sn
i ) ⇒ psn · zs > psn · xsni ; otherwise, zs would have
been chosen instead of xsni in the plan x
n
i (this is only true because Pi (s) = {s}).
Define ysi by adding some of the free good, (s, l), to x
s
i . By strict monotonicity:
usi (y
s
i ) > u
s
i (x
s
i ). By continuity, there exists some α ∈ (0, 1) such that usi (αysi ) >
usi (x
s
i ). For large n, we also have u
s
i (αy
s
i ) > u
s
i (x
sn
i ). This implies that p
sn · (αysi ) >
psn ·xsni , and in the limit, ps ·(αysi ) ≥ ps ·xsi . Therefore, ps ·ysi > ps ·xsi . Contradiction.unionsq
Proof of Theorem 1 Given Lemmas 1 and 2, all that is left to prove is (4),
which states that the limit of the sequence of equilibria, (x∗, p∗), is composed
of optimal choices in the original economy with uncertain delivery, that is,
xi ∈ Bi (p∗) ∩ Ci (p∗) ⇒ Ui (x∗i ) ≥ Ui (xi ), ∀i ∈ I.
By Lemma 3, we are sure that p∗  0.
Assume (by way of contradiction) that there exists yi ∈ Bi (p∗)∩ Ci (p∗) such that
Ui (yi ) > Ui (x∗i ). We will show that this implies that (x j , p j ) is not an equilibrium
of E j , for high j .
A preliminary remark
Suppose that prices for delivery in s and in t ∈ Pi (s) are parallel: p∗s = ap∗t . The
two deliverability conditions that involve prices p∗s and p∗t yield equalities:
{
p∗s · ysi ≤ p∗s · yti
p∗t · yti ≤ p∗t · ysi ⇔
{
ap∗t · ysi ≤ ap∗t · yti
p∗t · yti ≤ p∗t · ysi ⇔
{
p∗s · ysi = p∗s · yti
p∗t · yti = p∗t · ysi .
The two consumption bundles, ysi and y
t
i , cost the same in both states. Since t ∈ Pi (s),
we have usi = uti . If usi (ysi ) > usi (yti ), then the agent would be better off selecting
ysi for consumption in both states. Thus, we must have u
s
i (y
s
i ) = usi (yti ). Since the
utility functions are concave, the agent is not worse off consuming the average bundle
in both states. Notice that if the original vector satisfies the deliverability conditions,
then this average vector also does.
Construct x ′′i by modifying yi , considering the average bundle whenever there are
parallel prices. Therefore, we have x ′′si = x ′′ti whenever p∗s = ap∗t .
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Strategy of the proof
Reformulating, we assume (by way of contradiction) that there exists a x ′′i ∈
Bi (p∗) ∩ Ci (p∗) such that Ui (x ′′i ) > Ui (x∗i ), with x ′′si = x ′′ti whenever p∗s = ap∗t .
By continuity of Ui , there exists δ > 0 such that x ′i = (1−δ)x ′′i is strictly preferred
to x∗i , belongs to Ci (p∗), is in the interior of Bi (p∗), and is also in the interior of
Bi (p j ), for high j :
Ui (x ′i ) > Ui (x∗i ); x ′i ∈ Ci (p∗); p∗ · x ′i < p∗ · ei ; p j · x ′i < p j · ei ,∀ j ≥ j0.
Again, by continuity of Ui , there exists  > 0 such that d(xi , x ′i ) <  implies that
Ui (xi ) > Ui (x∗i ), with xi in the interior of Bi (p∗). For j ≥ j1 ≥ j0, Ui (xi ) > Ui (x ji )
(notice that we are considering Ui and not U ji ) and xi is in the interior of Bi (p j ).
Let j2 ≥ j1 be sufficiently high for d(p j , p∗) < ,∀ j ≥ j2.
Consider, for easiness of exposition and without loss of generality, the following
element of the agent’s information partition: Pi (s) = {1, . . . , s}. It should be clear
that this reasoning extends to any element of Pi . Since x ′i ∈ Ci (p∗), the deliverability
conditions are satisfied:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
p∗1 · x ′1i ≤ p∗1 · x ′2i ;
. . .
p∗1 · x ′1i ≤ p∗1 · x ′si ;
p∗2 · x ′2i ≤ p∗2 · x ′1i ;
. . .
p∗2 · x ′2i ≤ p∗2 · x ′si ;
. . .
. . .
p∗s · x ′si ≤ p∗s · x ′1i ;
. . .
p∗s · x ′si ≤ p∗s · x ′s−1i .
⇔
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
p∗1 · x ′2i − p∗1 · x ′1i = k12 ≥ 0;
. . .
p∗1 · x ′si − p∗1 · x ′1i = k1s ≥ 0;
p∗2 · x ′1i − p∗2 · x ′2i = k21 ≥ 0;
. . .
p∗2 · x ′si − p∗2 · x ′2i = k2s ≥ 0;
. . .
. . .
p∗s · x ′1i − p∗s · x ′si = ks1 ≥ 0;
. . .
p∗s · x ′s−1i − p∗s · x ′si = ks,s−1 ≥ 0.
We will find an xi that is a neighbor of x ′i and belongs to Ci (p j ) (contradicting the
fact that x ji is individually optimal at prices p j ). This proves (4) by contradiction.
Case 1 All inequalities are such that kst > 0.
With xi such that d(xi , x ′i ) < , denote dxi = xi − x ′i and dp j = p j − p∗.
Manipulating a deliverability condition:
p∗s · x ′ti − p∗s · x ′si = (p js − dp js) · (xti − dxti )
−(p js − dp js) · (xsi − dxsi ) = kst
⇔ p js · xti − p js · xsi = kst + p js · dxti + dps
·(xti − dxti ) − p js · dxsi − dps · (xsi − dxsi )
⇔ p js · xti − p js · xsi >kst −−(‖eT ‖ + ) − −(‖eT ‖+)
⇔ p js · xti − p js · xsi > kst − 2(‖eT ‖ + 1 − ).
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Let kmin = mint∈Pi (s) kst . Choose a smaller  > 0, if necessary, to make
2(‖eT ‖ + 1 − ) < kmin . This guarantees that the strict inequalities for x ′i and
p∗ remain strict for any xi s.t. d(xi , x ′i ) < , under p j with j ≥ j2.
There is no utility penalty; therefore, U ji (xi ) > U
j
i (x
j
i ). Contradiction. The con-
sumption plan in the equilibrium sequence, x ji , is not a maximizer of U
j
i .
Case 2 For every t ∈ Pi (s), prices p∗s and p∗t are not parallel.
The difference relative to Case 1 lies in checking that the inequalities which are
not strict at (x ′i , p∗) are still satisfied at (xi , p j ), for high j . The inequalities that are
not strict are those for which kst = 0.
Let γ st =
(
1 − p∗s ·p∗t‖p∗s‖‖p∗t‖
)
‖p∗s‖ and γ min = mint∈Pi (s) γ st > 0.
Define kmin as the minimum among the strictly positive kst and (as in Case 1)
choose  > 0 such that 2(‖eT ‖ + 1 − ) < kmin , to preserve the strict inequalities.
Select displacements from x ′i to xi that are parallel to p∗, choosing xi such that
dxsi = − 2 p
∗s
‖p∗s‖ .
Let 2 = γ min8‖eT ‖ , and consider j3 ≥ j2 that is high enough for: d(p j , p∗) <
min{2, },∀ j ≥ j3.
Consider an inequality that is not strict for p∗ and x ′i (kab = 0). Let us verify that
this deliverability condition still holds for p j and xi :
p ja · xbi − p ja · xai = (p∗a + dp ja) · (x ′bi + dxbi ) − (p∗a + dp ja) · (x ′ai + dxai )
= p∗a · (x ′bi + dxbi ) + dp ja · (x ′bi + dxbi ) − p∗a · (x ′ai + dxai )
−dp ja · (x ′ai + dxai )
= p∗a · dxbi + dp ja · (x ′bi +dxbi )− p∗a · dxai −dp ja · (x ′ai +dxai )
> p∗a · dxbi − 2(‖eT ‖ + ) − p∗a · dxai − 2(‖eT ‖ + )
= p∗a · dxbi − p∗a · dxai − 22(‖eT ‖ + )
> −p∗a · 
2
p∗b
‖p∗b‖ + p
∗a · 
2
p∗a
‖p∗a‖ − 42‖eT ‖
= 
2
p∗a · p∗a
‖p∗a‖‖p∗a‖‖p
∗a‖ − 
2
p∗a · p∗b
‖p∗a‖‖p∗b‖‖p
∗a‖ − 
2
γ min
= 
2
γ ab − 
2
γ min ≥ 0
In sum: p ja · xbi − p ja · xai > 0. The deliverability condition is verified, and thus
U ji (xi ) > U
j
i (x
j
i ). Contradiction.
Case 3 Prices p∗s and p∗t are parallel.
The same displacement as in Case 2, dxsi = − 2 p
∗s
‖p∗s‖ , is good for the case in which
prices p∗a and p∗b are parallel. In this case, x ′ai = x ′bi and also dxai = dxbi . Hence,
xai = xbi , and the conditions remain satisfied in equality.
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All deliverability conditions are satisfied; therefore, U ji (xi ) = Ui (xi ) > Ui (x ji ) ≥
U ji (x
j
i ). The consumption plan x
j
i does not maximize U
j
i , because xi is preferred.
This contradiction proves (4). unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2 Suppose, by way of contradiction (i) that all the agents i ∈ G
prefer to announce state t when the true state is s, usi (e
s
i +xt∗i −eti ) > usi (xs∗i ),∀i ∈ G;
(ii) that the agents in G agree that they should deviate, Pi (s) = Pj (s), ∀(i, j) ∈ G2;
and (iii) that the false report is not incompatible with the truthful reports of the other
agents, t ∈ ∩ j∈I\G Pj (s).
Since any state can be verified by at least one agent, there is some agent i ∈ G for
who Pi (s) = {s}. Therefore, from hypothesis (ii), Pj (s) = {s} , ∀ j ∈ G.
Denote by zs∗j and z
t∗
j the net trades of each agent j in states s and t , respectively.
The deliverability constraints imply that, for all j ∈ I \ G: ps · zs∗j ≤ ps · zt∗j .
Denote by Zs∗G and Z
s∗
−G the aggregate net trade in state s of the agents inside
and outside the coalition G, respectively. Adding the deliverability constraints of the
agents outside G, we obtain ps · Zs∗−G ≤ ps · Zt∗−G .
Since equilibrium prices are positive (see Lemma 3) and any state can be verified by
at least one agent, we have exact feasibility. Therefore, Zs∗G =−Zs∗−G and Zt∗G =−Zt∗−G .
This means that ps · Zs∗G ≥ ps · Zt∗G , which implies that ∃i ∈ G, ps · zs∗i ≥ ps · zt∗i .
But then we have a contradiction with the original choice of zs∗i instead of z
t∗
i to
be the net trade in state s, because zt∗i at least as cheap and strictly preferred to z
s∗
i .
Since the choice of agent i for delivery in state s was not subject to any deliverability
constraint (because Pi (s) = {s}), there cannot exist a net trade zt∗i that is at least as
cheap and strictly preferred to zs∗i . unionsq
Appendix 2: Example of non-existence of equilibrium
Consider an economy in which two agents trade a single good under uncertainty. There
are three states of nature, and the endowments depend on the state of nature:
eA = (100, 100, 1) and eB = (1, 100, 100).
Agents only observe their endowments:
PA = {{1, 2}; {3}} and PB = {{1}; {2, 3}}.
The different states occur with objective and publicly known probabilities:
μ = (μ1, μ2, μ3) = (0.45, 0.1, 0.45).
Risk aversion induces agents to trade ex ante, in order to maximize expected utility:
Ui (xi ) =
S∑
s=1
μs
√
xsi .
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Prices in states 1 and 3 must be strictly positive, or else the demands of agent B
and A would be infinite for the corresponding contingent goods.
With strictly positive prices for all the contingent goods, if agents selected different
consumption levels in states that they did not distinguish, then they would end up
receiving the cheapest of the alternatives, which would be the one with the lowest
consumption level. In this case, we must have:
xA = (x12A , x12A , x3A) and xB = (x1B, x23B , x23B ).
Since agents are at the frontier of their budget sets:
{
(p1 + p2)x12A + p3x3A = 100(p1 + p2) + p3;
p1x1B + (p2 + p3)x23B = p1 + 100(p2 + p3).
Adding the two:
p1(x12A + x1B) + p2(x12A + x23B ) + p3(x3A + x23B ) = 101p1 + 200p2 + 101p3.
For this to be an equilibrium, the allocation must be feasible:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x12A + x1B ≤ 101;
x12A + x23B ≤ 200;
x3A + x23B ≤ 101.
With strictly positive prices, the conditions are verified in equality. This implies
that the allocation is of the form:
{
xA =
(
x12A , x
12
A , x
3
A
) = (x3A + 99, x3A + 99, x3A
) ;
xB =
(
x1B, x
23
B , x
23
B
) = (x1B, x1B + 99, x1B + 99
)
.
The only individually rational allocation of this form corresponds to the initial
endowments. There is no trade. But are agents maximizing their utility levels?
{
xA = (100, 100, 1);
xB = (1, 100, 100). ⇒
{
U (xA) = 0.45 ∗ 10 + 0.1 ∗ 10 + 0.45 ∗ 1 = 5.95;
U (xB) = 0.45 ∗ 1 + 0.1 ∗ 10 + 0.45 ∗ 10 = 5.95.
Suppose that p1 = p3. Agent A can trade consumption in state 1 for consumption in
state 3. But consuming less in state 1 implies that delivery in state 2 will also be of
this lower quantity. In any case, the agent can select:
x ′1 = (x ′121 , x ′121 , x ′31 ) = (81, 81, 20).
The corresponding utility level is:
U (x ′1) = 0.45 × 9 + 0.1 × 9 + 0.45 × 4.47 = 6.96.
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In the case with asymmetric prices (p1 	= p3), the same trade is even more favorable
for one of the agents. We reached a contradiction, implying that there is no equilibrium
with strictly positive prices.
With p2 = 0, an alternative bundle can be big enough to violate feasibility and still
be deliverable. The deliverability restriction is not relevant because it is of the form
0 · x2 ≤ 0 · xs . Agents can choose a consumption level for state 2 that is big enough to
violate feasibility and still desire to increase it. There cannot be a rational expectations
equilibrium with p2 = 0.
Appendix 3: The deliverability correspondence
The set of bundles that satisfy the deliverability restrictions depends on the prevailing
prices. Consider the correspondence from prices to the set of deliverable bundles:
Ci : SL  RSL+ ;
Ci (p) =
{
x ∈ RSL+ : ∀s ∈ S, ps · xs = min
t∈Pi (s)
{ps · xt }
}
.
If the correspondence Bi (p) ∩ Ci (p) were continuous, we could apply Berge’s maxi-
mum theorem and Kakutani’s fixed point theorem to establish existence of equilibrium
in economies with uncertain delivery.
Upper hemicontinuity of Ci at p0 means that, given an arbitrary open set, V , con-
taining Ci (p0), there exists δ > 0 such that for all p ∈ B(p0, δ), we have Ci (p) ⊆ V .
The correspondence is closed since all the restrictions are inequalities that are not
strict. With a compact range, a closed-valued correspondence is upper hemicontinu-
ous if and only if it is closed. Therefore, when restricted to a bounded economy (for
example, by the total initial endowments in the economy), Ci is upper hemicontinuous.
Lower hemicontinuity of Ci at p0 means that given an arbitrary open set, V , inter-
secting Ci (p0), there exists δ > 0 such that for all p ∈ B(p0, δ), the image Ci (p)
also intersects V .
The correspondence under study, Ci , is not lower hemicontinuous. Lower hemi-
continuity fails when prices in are null (ps = 0) or collinear (ps = apt ).
When prices are null, the deliverability restrictions disappear. It is always true that
0 · xs ≤ 0 · xt . But with a small perturbation, the restrictions appear. This is why l.h.c.
fails.
When prices are collinear, the failure of l.h.c. is more subtle.
Consider an economy with two goods, A and B, and two states of nature, s and t . Let
p0 = (ps0, pt0) = (pAs0 , pBs0 ; pAt0 , pBt0 ) =
( 1
4 ,
1
4 ; 14 , 14
)
. The bundle x0 = (1, 0; 0, 1)
belongs to the deliverable set, since:
ps0 · xs0 ≤ ps0 · xt0 ⇔
1
4
≤ 1
4
, and
pt0 · xt0 ≤ pt0 · xs0 ⇔
1
4
≤ 1
4
.
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Delivering (1, 0) in state s and (0, 1) in state t does not violate deliverability because
both bundles have the same price in both states.
A small perturbation in prices can make (0, 1) cheaper in state s and (1, 0) cheaper
in state t . Consider an open ball around x0 with radius 0 <  < 110 . After a pertur-
bation in prices to p = ( 14 + δ, 14 − δ, 14 − δ, 14 + δ
)
, this ball does not intersect the
deliverable set.
Suppose that there existed a vector dx = (As, Bs, At , Bt ) such that x = (1 +
As, Bs; At , 1 + Bt ) is inside that open ball and belongs to the deliverable set:
(i) ( 14 + δ, 14 − δ
) · (1 + As, Bs) ≤ ( 14 + δ, 14 − δ
) · (At , 1 + Bt )
⇔ ( 14 + δ
)
(1 + As) + ( 14 − δ
)
Bs ≤ ( 14 + δ
)
At + ( 14 − δ,
)
(1 + Bt )
⇔ 14 + 14As +δ+δAs + 14Bs −δBs ≤ 14At +δAt + 14 + 14Bt −δ−δBt
⇔ 14 (As + Bs − At − Bt ) + δ(As − Bs − At + Bt ) ≤ −2δ;
(ii) ( 14 − δ, 14 + δ
) · (At , 1 + Bt ) ≤ ( 14 − δ, 14 + δ
) · (1 + As, Bs)
⇔ ( 14 − δ
)
At + ( 14 + δ
)
(1 + Bt ) ≤ ( 14 − δ
)
(1 + As + ( 14 + δ
)
Bs)
⇔ 14 (At +1+Bt −1−As −Bs)+δ(−At +1+1+Bt +As −Bs) ≤ 0
⇔ 14 (At + Bt − As − Bs) + δ(−At + Bt + As − Bs) ≤ −2δ.
Adding the two inequalities, we obtain:
δ(As − Bs − At + Bt ) ≤ −2δ ⇔ As − Bs − At + Bt ≤ −2.
Which is impossible, because As − Bs − At + Bt ≥ −4 > − 410 .
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